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202/ X/75 -E THE  STABILIZATION  OF  EXPORT  EARNINGS 
I. The  problem of the instability of export  earnings 
A)  The  effects of unstable  export  earnings 
As  a  general  rule,  the benefits of price rises do  not  seem  to offset the 
disadvantages of price falls even if both variations appear to be of the 
same  magnitude. 
Disturbance  caused by  fluctuationsin export  earnings  m~  take various 
forms. 
1.- Such  fluctuations disrupt  investment  planning because  the  economic 
structures of the  developing countries are  in many  cases too rigid to 
enable them  to take full  advantage  of  an unexpected increase in their 
export  earnings,whereas if these  suddenly drop,projects in progress have 
to be  abandoned or suspended,with no  possibility of  immediately substituting 
alternative projects with a  smaller import  content. 
For developing countries dependent  on highly unstable  commodities, 
the  tendenqy is therefore for a  sudden rise in export  earnings to lead 
to increased imports  of  consumer  goods,  while  a  sharp fall usually 
results in a  worsening of the  country's debt  position. 
2.- Fluctuations in export  earnings also have the effect of upsetting 
the  internal balance of public finances.  When  prices are rising,  governments 
will often increase public current  expenditure,  which  is difficult to  cut 
back if the trend is reversed. The  loss of tax revenue  must  then be 
offset either by  higher rates of taxation on the producers'  incomes,or 
by recourse to domestic borrowing with the risk of inflation which that 
entails. In either case,  the  erosion of the producers'real  income  m~ lead 
them  to abandon production for export  and thus precipitate the decline 
of EKport  earnings. -2-
3o- Lastly,  the effects of fluctuations in export  earnings  on the balance 
of payments  situation are obvious. If prices fall,  these effects will be 
aggravated in maqy  instances,  b,y  anticipatory movements  on  the part of 
transactors,  such  as transfers of capitalwroad, faster payments for 
imports,  delays  in repatriating export  earnings,  etc. 
Therefore,  a  poliqy aimed  at stabilizing export  earnings must  not 
only act  on  the  structures of the exporting country's  economy  but  must 
also mitigate the current difficulties of transactors  (producers  and 
State)  so that the latter do  not  react  to unexpected fluctuations  in export 
earnings in a  way  which  would  worsen the structural  imbalances of the  econo~. 
It is essential here that stabilization measures  should be  so  devised 
that they are not  open to the criticisms incurred by  all systems  which 
have the effect of insulating producers  and  exporters from  market  forces. 
B)  Price fluctuations and variations in the quantities  exported 
When  the factors  contributing to the instability of the developing coun-
tries'export  earnings are analysed,  it can be  seen that fluctuation in 
commodity  prices is not  the only phenomenon  involved. The  Commission has 
studied the variations in export quantities,  prices and  earnings for fourteen 
main  commodities  exported by  the developing countries,  taking into account 
for each product  a  number  of developing countries exporting between them 
from  60  to 7o%  of the developing countries'total exports of the product  in 
question. Forty-four cases of variation were  established in this way,  and 
their analysis produces the following  conclusions  : 
1.- If price fluctuations  and  variations in quantities are  compared,  it is 
apparent  that 
In 28  cases quantities fluctuate more  sharply than prices. In 16  of these 
cases fluctuations in quantities are less than 2o%  ;  in a  further 6  cases 
they are between 20  and  30%,  and  in the  remaining 6  cases they are greater 
than3o% 
In 16  cases price fluctuations are greater than variations in quantities. 
This  shows  for the first time that quantities fluctuate relatively more 
sharply than prices, These quantity fluctuations are generally  caused by 
one  or other of the following factors  or a  combination thereof -3-
- price fluctuation following changes  in the economic  trend in the 
industrialized countries  ; 
climatic conditions in the exporting developing countries  ; 
- independent  factors  such as  drops  in production due  to strikes,accidents, 
wars,etc. 
2.- If variations in quantities are  compared  with fluctuations  in export 
earnings,  it is apparent  that 
In 18  cases fluctuations  in earnings  are approximately  equal  to those 
in quantities  ;  consequently,  variations in quantities have more  or less 
offset price fluctuations,  or vice versa. 
Of  these 18  cases the  two  variables fluctuated by  less than lo%  in 6 
cases,  by  between 10  and  2Q%  in 8  cases,  and  b,y  more  than  2Q%  in 4  cases. 
Where  quantities and prices var,y  inversely,  the smallest variation - in 
this case that of prices - is cancelled out. 
In 26  cases variation in prices and that in quantities have  a  cumulative 
effect thus  considerably increasing the instability of export  earnings. 
Price stabilization is not  enough  in itself,therefore,to stabilize 
the developing countries'export  earnings and  consequently bring about  the 
harmonious  economic  development  of the developing countries which  export 
commodities.  On  the  contrar,y,  it may  even be  detrimental to their economic 
development,  since price stabilization amounts  to restricting - to the 
disadvantage of the  exporting developing countries - the possibilities of 
compensation which  could be  offered them  over a  period of time.  By  abolishing 
or diminishing the role of one  of the market  regulators,price stabilization 
alone  could even make  export  earnings more  unstable if fluctuations  in 
production were  caused b,y  non-economic factors. 
In this event,  a  sudden and  temporary  cut  in production would  not be 
offset by price rises. As  a  result,  not  only would  the  countr.y fail to 
achieve the level of earnings which it could have  expected before prices 
were  stabilized, but also producers would  have  no  material  incentive to step -4-
up their production efforts during the following year. Moreover,  in the 
case of products for which prices are not  only unstable but  alAo  show 
a  basic tendency to  fall as  a  result  of competition from  synthetic products, 
mere  stabilization of prices would  have the effect of speeding up  the 
production of substitute products. 
C)  The  principal wgys  of remegying the instability of  export  earnings or its 
effects 
Four different weys  of influencing the export  earnings of countries 
producing commodities  can be  distinguished : 
- market  intervention to influence the prices paid to producers  ; 
- the granting of trade preferences to certain producer countries  ; 
- ad hoc institutional solutions disregarding market  mechanisms  ; 
- a  s,ystem  involving no  interference with market  mechanisms  and providing 
for direct payements to producer countries to offset the difference, 
established ex post between export  earnings and  their reference level 
fixed b,y  agreement. 
1.- Market  intervention 
The  techniques of market  intervention to influence the prices of 
commodities  involve breaking down  the  export market ,monitoring su.ppl.Y  a.Iicf 
possibly establishing buffer stocks. 
In the Community's  case,  these solutions would  normally apply only in 
respect of those commodities of which it is the major world importer. The 
Community's  dominant  position on the world market  could then enable it to 
influence the price of the product  in question through an arrangement 
providing for market  interYentions. 
These  solutions imply  : 
- keeping supply under control which  countries with small  administrations can-
not  easily enforce on  individual producers  ; 
- the financing of buffer stocks,  which is often costly ; 
- impartiality on the part of the consumer  countries as regards  shar~ng 
the benefits of the agreement  in question among  the producer countries. 
The  wholesale transfer of these benefits to producers ia often difficult 
to avoid,despite the possible repercussions  of  such a  transfer on the 
growth of supply. -5-
However,  most  of the consumer  countries,  are opposed to these solutions, 
which  is easily understandable. Microeconomic  analysis  shows  that if it 
were  possible to predict the  average level of prices for a  commodity  and 
to stabilize them  at that level by  means  of a  buffer stock,consumers  would 
suffer as  a  result of stabilization wherever the instability of prices was 
mainly  due  to fluctuations in supply. This is the case with most  tropical 
agricultural products  which  owe  their unstable prices to production hazards 
much  more  than to fluctuations  in demand.If the consumer  countries 
reluctantly agree nonetheless to  conclude a  world  agreement  to stabilize 
the prices for a  product  of this kind  ,  they will then be  tempted to 
e:xert pressure on the producer countries to accept prices being stabilized 
at  a  relatively low level i.e. lower than the most  probable average price. 
However,  the positions of the  consumer  and producer countries are 
reversed where  price instability is mainly due  to fluctuations  in demand. 
This is the  case  with most  mineral  products  (copper,for example),  where 
prices are  influenced far more  by  changes  in the  economic  trend in the 
industrialized countries than by  changes  in the  conditions of supply. 
Here,  it is in the interests of the consumer  countries to promote  those 
stabilization measures  which  are within their reach,  whereas  the producer 
countries might  prefer prices to  remain unstable if they could predict 
to what  extent  and  in what  direction prices would  fluctuate. 
In any  event,  commodity  market  intervention will have  a  stabilizing 
influence on the  export  earnings of the producer countries only in respect 
of products whose  prices are more  unstable  than the quantities exported. 
Measures  to stabilize world  or  commodity  agreement  prices cannot 
bring down  the instability index for export  earnings below that for quantities. 
At  world level,  prices are generally more  unstable than quantities 
exported where  price instability is mainly due  to fluctuations in demand 
in the  consumer  countries. This is the  case with  copper and most  mineral 
products,tropical timber,cotton,rubber - in other words  most  of the major 
commodities used in industr,y. 
.  j -6-
On  a  smaller scale the  same  phenomenoa  is observed  (prices more  unstable 
than the quantities exported)where fluctuat1ons  in world prices are  caused 
by  supply disturbances  in the main producer countries which  are not 
signator,y to a  given commodity  agreement. 
In both cases1market  intervention can stabilize not  only prices but 
also the volume  of transactions,  and therefore the earnings of  exporting 
countries. 
If, however,  market  instability is mainly due  to fluctuations 
of  supply in the  countries  signator,y to such an agreement,mere 
stabilization of prices is likely to make  their export  earnings still 
more  unstable. 
To  sum  up,  market  intervention 
-is applicable on  a  less than worldwide  scale·only in a  limited 
number  of cases  ; 
hardly satisfies the  consumer  countries in most  cases,except where  a 
relatively low  stabilization price is fixed  ; 
- has  an influence only on  commodity  prices,whereas the  aim  must  be to 
stabilize the  export  earnings of the producer countries. 
In view of these drawbacks,it  would  seem  that market  intervention 
techniques should not  be used in the  context  of the Convention.  In addition, 
the  existence of world agreements for certain products does  not  mean  that 
arrangements  of  a  different type  cannot be worked  out  to mitigate certain 
shortcomings in those agreements,which they would  supplement. 
2.- Preferential  systems 
Such.systems  are by  definition geographically limited,based as  they 
are on  guaranteed price systems  whereb.y  the producer countries signator,y 
to the  relevant  agreement  are accorded tariff preferences or reductions  in 
levies. A solution of this type while  acceptable for products already subject 
to  customs  duties on  importation or covered by the  common  agricultural policy, 
would  raise serious objections if it entailed new  barriers to international 
trade. 
A solution such as this can only beenvisaged where  the  commodities 
exported by the countries signatory to  an agreement  account for only a 
small proportion of the world market. If this condition were  not  met,  the 
preferential  system would  have  no  real  content. -7-
Lastly, it should be noted that a  system of preferential prices 
backed up by tariff and  levy instruments  would mean that machinery would 
have to be  set up  to  ensure that  Community  industries processing the  commodities 
covered by the agreement  in question were  internationally competitive. 
3.- Non-market  institutional solutions ~aranteed purchase and price) 
This approach requires the setting up  of bodies to buy  from  the  pro~ 
ducer  countries specific quantities of the product  covered by the agreement 
at the price fixed,. for  subsequent  disposal on the Community  market,  putting 
back on the world market,  storage or denaturing. 
The  principle behind the Commonwealth  Sugar  Agreement  places it in 
this category.  Such a  system provides maximum  gurantees for the producer  coun-
tries but  would  probably be: 
- politically unacceptable to all the Member  States of the  Community  as it 
covers a  large number  of.products; 
- ineffective in the long term,  since the system would  insulate the producer 
and  consumer  countries party to the agreement  in question from  market  cons-
traints unless accompanied by measures affecting production structures. 
4·- Non-intervention on the market  and  compensatory payments 
The  basic principles behind this kind of system are the following: 
- the fixing of a  reference price by  product  (and where applicable by country) 
for "traditional" quantities; 
a  gurantee for those countries receiving a  transfer of financial resources 
equal to all or part of the difference between the actual value of 
exports to the Community  (price x  quantities exported)  and the reference 
value  (price x  quantities). 
Such a  system would  offer the following advantages -8-
- its principle is simple; 
- it permits adjustment  of the transfers going to  countries most  affected 
by theinstability of their export  earnings,  whatever the reason for this 
instability; 
- it protects the recipient  countries against market  contingencies while 
allowing the market  to retain its role as an indicator of pressures, 
arising from  scarcities,  between supply and demand; 
- it is relatively cheap to run and can even,  under  certain conditions, 
be self-sufficient. 
+ 
+  + 
In view of the  economic analysis  summarized above  and a  number  of 
political constraints,  which dictate that the  system to be set  up  should: 
- not  interfere with the free play of market  forces; 
not  create obstacles to international trade; 
- be  compatible with world agreements  where these exist  for the products 
in question and not  obstruct the conclusion of new  world agreements, 
the  Commission  proposed,  on 4.April 1973  that  a  system of stabilizing of 
export  earnin.gs  would be the most  appropriate way  of implementing Part III 
of Protocol N°  22  to the Act  of Accession 1• 
Christened by the press the "Deniau Plan" after the member  of the 
Commission  of the European Communities  then responsible for Development  and 
Cooperation,  this proposal was  the subject of long and difficult negotiations 
successfully concluded under  Mr  Claude  Cheysson,  who  succeeded Mr  Deniau. 
1  Part III of Protocol N°  22  states that  "The  Community  will have as its 
firm  purpose the  safeguarding of the interests of all the countries referred 
to in this Protocol"  - i.e.  AASM  and independent  developing Commonwealth 
countries in Africa,  the Indian Ocean,  the Pacific Ocean  and the Caribbean-" 
whose  economies  depend to a  considerable extent  on the export  of primary 
products,  and particularly of sugar.  The  question of sugar will be settled 
within this framework,  bearing in mind with regard to  exports of sugar the 
importance of this product  for the  economies  of  several of these countries 
and of the  Commonwealth  countries in particular." -9-
It would  certainly be interesting to trace the development  of ideas 
between 4 April 1973  and 1 February 1975  and follow the system's  chequered 
career from  the initial proposal,  which to  say the least was  at the outset 
far  from  arousing unqualified enthusiasm whether  among  the industrialized 
countries,  including some  of those within the  Community,  or among  other 
developing countries,  and which now  it is completed may  not  perhaps fulfil 
all the hopes  placed in it by the ACP  States,  to the final text agreed by 
the negotiators.  Unfortunately this would require too much  space,  and the 
reader is accordingly asked to  content  himself with the following  comments 
on  "STABEX"  - the  code name  given to the system - as defined by the  Convention, 
II. The  stabilization system in the  Convention 
Stabex "has the aim  of remedying the harmful  effects of the instabi-
lity of export  earnings and of thereby  enaonng the  ACP  States to achieve the 
the stability, profitability and  sustained growth of their economies."  The 
products  covered by the system,  its machinery,  the financial arrangements 
and its other aspects will be described here  successively. 
A.  The  products  covered 
1.- For the purpose of compiling the list of products,  two  sets of criteria 
were taken into consideration: 
- those adopted at Kingston,  namely the importance of the product  for the 
level of employment  in the exporting country,  the deterioration in the 
terms  of trade between the  Community  and the ACP  State concerned,  and the 
level of development  in the different  ACP  States; 
- the fact  that  earnings  from  a  product are traditionally unstable because 
of fluctuations in prices and/or quantities,  and the dependence of the 
economies of the ACP  States on these products.1 
The  dependence criterion is expressed by fixing a  "dependence thre-
shold".  In normal  circumstances,  export  earnings  from  the product in question 
must,  in the  year preceding each year of application,  represent  at  least 
1  See  appendix for brief statistical information on this question. - 10-
7.5%  of total earnings  from  exports of goods.  For sisal, this proportion 
is reduced to  5%,  and for the least developed,  landlocked or island ACP 
States,  to 2.5%.  The  dependence threshold principle calls for twe remarks: 
the fact  that these thresholds are recalculated each year is one of the 
factors which gives the system its dynamic  character and keeps it close to 
economic reality.  The  annual  calculation of the thresholds provides  a 
"photograph" of the trend of .the  economy  of the product  concerned in the 
general  economic  trend of each country; 
- the fixing of a  lower threshold for the least  developed,  landlocked or 
island ACP  States denotes the negotiators'  concern to reserve special 
treatment  for these.States. 
Some  of the criteria mentioned above are applicable as  long as the 
system is, in operation.  If,  a  year or more after the  Convention has  come 
into force,  it appeared that  one or more products not yet  included were 
to assume  considerable importance for  one or more  of the ACP  States and be 
subject to sizeable fluctuations,  the  Council of Ministers  can decide to 
include  such product or products among  those  covered by the scheme. 
2.- Application of the above criteria led to the compilation of a 
list comprising several  groups of products: 
a  number  of tropical  commodities more  or less  corresponding to the  seven 
products originally proposed by  the Commission:  g.roundnuts,  cocoa,  coffee, 
cotton,  coconut products,  bananas; 
a  number  of products which are similar in some  ways  to those of the first 
group:  hides,  skins and  leather,  wood,  tea,  raw  sisal,  palm  products; 
certain products obtained from  commod~ties after initial processing: 
groundnut oil and oilcake,  cocoa paste and butter,  extracts,  essences 
or concentrates of coffee,  etc.; -II-
iron ore,  which the  Community  agreed to include only for the sake of 
not  jeopardizing the achievement  of an overall agreement,  for it remains 
firmly opposed to the extension of the system to mineral products. 
There are two  ways  of looking at the list. If the products are taken 
by family,  the number  is 12. If the number  of members  in the different 
families are  counted - which is what  really has to  be  done  since  each pro-
due is "insured"  separately - the number  is 29. 
3.- The  system applies to products originating in the ACP  States and 
exported by them  to the  Community,  i.e. which are released for home  use in 
the  Community  or brought  under  inward processing arrangements there in order 
to  be processed. 
In certain special cases,  the system  covers all exports,  whatever 
their destination.  At  the time of signature,  this derogation concerns 
Burundi,  Ethiopia,  Guinea  Bissau,  Rwanda  and Swaziland.  This list of coun-
tries could,  if necessary,  be amended  by mutual agreement. 
B.  The  machinery 
1.- Central to the machinery is the use of the ACP  States'  export  statis-
tics and the  Community's  import  statistics. Because the statistics may  not 
tally for various reasons  (time lag between  shipment  and  clearance through 
the Community  customs,  rerouting of cargoes  to a  different destination, 
etc.), they will have to be  cross-checked in order to arrive at definitive 
figures.  The  fob values are to be taken into account.  Because fob values 
are generally used for  export  statistics and cif values for import  statis-
tics,  these figures will either have to be  cross-checked,  or else a  fob/ 
cif coefficient will have to be applied. 
To  facilitate these cross-checks,  and generally ensure that the 
system works  rapidly and well,  statictical and  customs  cooperation will be 
set up  between the Commission  and the ACP  States. Within this framework, 
the ACP  States and the  Commission will take any practical measures to 
facilitate the  exchange of information and the submission of requests for - 12-
transfer·s. 
2.- The  statistics will be used in the first place to  calculate the 
reference level for  each ACP  State and for  each product.  This reference 
level is the moving average,  for the four years preceding each year of 
application,  of each ACP  State's earnings from  its exports to the  Commu-
nity.  The  reference level for 1975,  for  example,  will be calculated on 
the basis of the results of the years 1971  to 1974,  for  1976  on the basis 
of the results from  1972  to 1975,  and  so  on. 
j- Secondly,  the actual results for  each year of application can be 
determined from  the statistics. The  first  condition which must  be met  if 
the system is to be brought  into action is that actual  earnings in a  given 
year must  be  lower than the reference level.  Although necessary,  this  con-
dition is not  sufficient, for in addition this difference must  be higher 
than a  threshold known  as the "activation" or "fluctuation" threshold.  This 
is normally 7•5%,  but  for the least-developed,  land-locked or island coun-
tries it is 2.5.%. 
4·- Once it is established that the activation threshold has  been 
passed,  the difference between the reference level and actual  earnings 
constitutes the basis for the transfer. 
Each  ACP  State concerned must  apply to the  Commission  for  a  transfer; 
the latter examines the request  and  draws  up  a  draft transfer decision 
in conjunction with the requesting State. 
If,  however,  the examination shows  that the fall in earnings from 
exports to the  Community is the result of trade policy measures  which are 
restrictive or discriminate against the Community,  the application cannot 
be  considered. 
Moreover,  apart  from  the normal  case of fluctuations  due to market 
and production contingencies and apart  from  the case of a  restrictive trade 
policy,  there are many  other reasons why  export  earnings may  fall.  For 
instance,  although exports remain constant in volume,  the proportions going 
to their different destinations may  vary;  commodity  exports may  fall  because - 13-
local  processing  develops or local  consumption increases;exports may  also 
fall as a  result of a  natural disaster or a  reduction in demand. 
In  some  of the  situations which have  just been enumerated - .and  the 
above list is not  exhaustive - there might  be  a  risk of the  system  coming 
into play where  economic  conditions did not  justify it. To  deal with this 
risk,  the Commission  ascertains whether the trend of the applicant  ACP 
State's total  exports reveals  important  changes.  If so,  the  Commission  and 
the applicant  State consult  to  determine whether,  and to what  extent,  the 
amount  of the transfer would  be affected. 
5.- When  these  examinations and the necessary consultations have  taken 
place and the transfer decision ha3  been drafted in co~~tion with the appli-
cant  State,  the Commission then adopts this decision,  which  is rendered 
operative by the conclusion of a  "Transfer Agreement"  between the Commission 
and  the applicant  State. 
6.- It is important  that there  should be  arrangements  for  payments  on 
account,  for the reasons mentioned in the  first  part above,  particularly 
because transfers have  a  stabilizing effect  only if they are made  as  far as 
possible  simultaneously with the first effects of the fall  in earnings and 
also  because if the time lag were too great,  the transfers might  actually 
have  a  destabilizing effect. 
The  Convention expressly provides  for this possibility,  since it refers 
to  "advances normally six-monthly".  This provision is fundamentally relati-
vely easy to apply if it is borne in mind  that the annual  profile of a  country's 
exports is generally constant  in time.  In other words,  the monthly pattern 
of exports varies little,  which means  that  seasonal  adjustment  factors  can 
be  used. - I~-
What  does vary,  however,  is the monthly amplitude.  The  amount  of the 
advances will  therefore  be  determined by the use of seasonal  adjustment 
factors  and  by taking into account  variations in the amplitude. 
To  sum  up,  these are  straightforward tasks making use of well-established 
statistical techniques but  involving a  considerable amount  of work.  This 
work,. however,  will  not  be  without  purpose,  nor will it be dictated by 
perfectionism  :  the logic of the  system itself requires it. - l5-
C)  Financial arrangements 
1.- A total amount  of not  more  than 375  million u.a.  has  been set  aside to 
finance the stabilization system  for the life of the Convention.  This  amount 
is divided into  five  annual  instalments of 75  million u.a.+). Any  remainder 
of an annual  instalment  is automatically carried over to the following year. 
If transfers to be. made  in any year should  exceed the amount  of the annual 
instalment,  the Council of Ministers amy  authorize,  except  of course inthe 
final year,  an advance drawing of up  to 20 %  of the  following instalment. 
The  above  is a  summary  of the provisions in the Convention.  In practice 
they mean  : 
- that  everthing has  been done  to  see that the system  can play its part 
throughout the life of the  Convention and that accordingly there is no 
justification for the  fears  sometimes  expressed that it will rapidly run 
out  of funds; 
- that  as  from  the  second year,  on the assumption that the first  instalment 
has not  been wholly  spent,  the resources available would  be  as  follows  : 
•  any remaining carried forward  from  preceding years, 
•  the annual  instalment  of 75  million u.a., 
•  up to 50 million u.a. which can be  drawn in advance  on the following 
year' s  instalment,· 
•  resources  set  aside for the system  in accordance with the principle 
that the ACP  States will,  under certain conditions,  contribute to the 
reconstitution of the  fund. 
Of course,  if no  money  is carried over,  if no  contribution is made  to 
the reconstitution of the  fund,  and if as much  as 20 %  of the  following 
year's instalment  has  had to be  drawn,  i.e., assuming the worst,  then obvious-
ly available resources might  be only 90  million u.a.  for the first year, 
75  million u.a.  for the second,  third and fourth years,  and 60 million u.a. 
for the last year. Although this is a  sphere  ruled by uncertainties,  the 
possibility that the worst  might  happen is remote. 
+)  If this amount  were  regarded as an insurance premium  and related to the 
"risk" to be covered  (see the total  shown  in the  second part of the 
appendix),  it would  be  found that it represented approximately 4 %  of 
that risk. - 16-
Nonetheless,  the negotiators insisted .on  preparing for such a  possibility, 
and had a  clause  inserted in the Convention which  stipulates that the Council 
of Ministers may  reduce the amount  of the transfers to be made  under the system 
on the basis of a  report  submitted to them  by the Commission. 
If,  as is expected and account  is taken of contributions to reconstitute 
the  fund,  there are any funds left over after the expiry of the Convention,  the 
Council  of Ministers will decide how  these amounts  are to be  spent. 
2.- The States which have received transfers - which,  it should be  emphasized, 
are interest-free - are to contribute to the reconstitution of the  system's 
resources if the Commission notes that,  for any year and  for any product,  the 
unit value of exports+)  is greater than the reference unit value and that the 
quantity actually exported to the Community  is at  least  equal to the reference 
quantity.  In this case,  the recipient State is required to pay back into the 
system within the limit of the transfers it has received,  an amount  equal to 
the reference quantity multiplied by the difference between  the reference 
unit value and the actual unit value. 
Some  examples are called for.  In them  the reference value is assumed 
to be 10 000,  obtained by multiplying a  reference unit value of 100 by a 
reference quantity of 100,  and the country in question will  be  assumed to 
have  received during the preceding year a  transfer amounting to 1  000. 
- Case  1  : 
The  actUal  unit value is 120,  and the actual quantities are 80,  so  that 
actual  earnings are  9 600.  Although the unit values have risen,  the country 
not  only does not  have to  pay anything back into the  fund,  but may  ask for 
a  transfer. 
- Case  2  : 
The  unit value is 105,  actual quantities are 100.  In this case actual 
earnings amount  to 10 500  and  the country pays back 500. 
+)  The  reference level is the  product  of the reference quantities multiplied 
by the reference unit value.  The  same  applies to the actual  earnings. 
Whereas  for the purpose of transfers it is enough to  know  the figures 
relating to the reference level and actual  earnings,  each of the factors 
has to be taken separately to  implement  the provisions for reconstituting 
the  fund. - 17-
- Case  3  : 
The  unit value is 120,  the actual  quantities 100.  Because the country has 
received one  transfer only of 1000,  it will  have to pay back 1000,  though 
its actual  earnings amount  to 12  000. 
- Case  4  : 
The  unit value is 100,  the actual  quanti  tl,es are 110.  Although  actual  ear-
nings are 11  ooo,  the country is not required to pay  anything back,  since 
the actual unit value does not  exceed the reference unit value. 
3.  If,  on  expiry of the five-year period referred to in paragraph 2,  the 
resources have  not  been fully reconstituted,  the  Council  of Ministers,  taking 
into consideration in particular the situation and prospects for  the balance 
of payments,  exchange  reserves and  foreign  indebtedness of the  ACP  States 
concerned,  may  decide that the  sums  outstanding are  to be reconstituted 
wholly or in part,  in one  or more  instalments,  or that rights to repayment 
are to be waived. 
4.  States regarded  as being among  the least developed within the  meaning 
of the Title on  financial  and  technical  cooperation are  exempted  from  having 
to make  any  contribution to reconstitution of the  fund. 
D)  Other aspects of the  system  and  final  comments 
1.  It will be  noted that States receiving transfers will be  free to de-
cide for  themselves how  the funds  shall be  used.  They  will nonetheless be 
required to inform the  Commission  each year of the use which has been made 
of the amounts  transferred. 
2.  The  period of application of this system will be the  same  as that 
laid down  for financial  and  technical  cooperation. 
3.  It will  also be noted that the stabilization system has two  lists of 
least developed countries:  the "least developed,  land-locked or island· 
countries'• to which  the  special  dependence  and  activation thresholds apply, 
and  the "least developed countries11  within the meaning of the  arrangements 
for financial  and  technical  cooperation,  which are the only ones not re-
quired to contribute to the reconstitution of the  fund. I 
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4.  It will  be recalled that under Article 118  of the Treaty of Accession, 
measures taken under Protocol  No  22  are extended to include the  OCT.  This 
means  that these Countries and Territo!ies will also be  covered by the  sta-
bilization system under  a  decision to be taken by the  Council  of the Euro-
pean  Communities.  This decision will be closely modelled  on  Chapter 1  of 
Title II,  any  special points arising from  the  statute of the  OCT  being taken 
into considePation. 
+ 
+  + 
In setting up  a  system of export  earnings stabilization,  the  Convention 
is making  a  major  innovation in international  economic relations.  Apart  from 
the  IMF  system of compensatory financing,  which is substantially different 
from  the stabilization  s~stem negotiated by  the  Community  and the  ACP  States 
both in its purpose  and  in its methods,  this is the first time that  indu-
strialized countries and  developing countries exporting commodities have 
agreed to  set up  a  system designed to guarantee the latter a  certain level 
of export  earnings by  shielding these earnings against the fluctuations to 
which they are normally exposed by the  action of market  forces  and  the ha-
zards of production. 
The  considerable political  significance of this innovation cannot  be 
overestimated.  This is an  initial practical response,  incomplete though it 
is, to a  number  of anxieties which  have  for  decades passed prevented the 
development  of harmonious  and  balanced relations between those who  produce 
raw  materials and  those who  use  them. - 19-
A case  for  special treatment:  sugar 
Protocol  N°  17  annexed to the Act  concerning the  Conditions of Acces-
sion and the Adjustments to the Treaties provided that until 28  February 1975 
the United Kingdom  was  authorized to import  from  the exporting countries and 
territories referred to in the Commonwealth  Sugar  Agreement,  on  certain terms, 
quantities of sugar within the negotiated price quotas under that Agreement, 
and Title III of Protocol  N°  22  stated that the  Community  would  have  as its 
firm purpose  the  safeguarding of the interests of all the countries referred 
to in that Protocol whose  economies depended  to  a  con-siderable  extent  on  the 
export of primary products and particularly of sugar. 
The  arrangements for this p~oduct had to be laid down  within this 
framework  and  were  to take  account,  as regards  sugar exports,  of its impor-
tance for the  economy  of several  of the  above  countries,  in particular the 
Commonwealth  countries. 
The  result of proUacted negotiations between the Aa?  States and  the 
EEC,  the  special  arrangements  implementing these intentions now  appear in 
Title II,  Chapter 2  of the Lome  Convention,  and  the conditions of implemen-
tation of the Article in question are laid down  in a  Protocol  annexed to 
the Convention  and  accompanied by declarations relating thereto. 
The  agreement  which the Contracting Parties reached provides for the 
exporting ACP  States to  supply,  and  for  the  Community  to purchase  and  im-
port,  specified quantities of sugar at  a  guaranteed minimum  price.  These 
commitments  have  b_een  entered into for  an  indefinite period,  although there 
is a  legal possibility of denunciation after five years subject to  two 
years' notice. - 20-
The  guaranteed price,  expressed in units of account,  for unpacked 
sugar of standard quality is negotiated annually cif European ports,  within 
the price range obtaining in the Coiiiiii'Wiity.  In fact,  this guarantee relates 
to  sugar which  could not  be  marketed on  satisfactory terms at prices freely 
negotiated between  sellers and  buyers. 
The  guaranteed price for the  next  eighteen months  is fixed at 225,30 
u.a.  per tonne cif,  corresponding on  1  February 1975  to a  United Kingdom  price 
of b  151.15,  but  in practice the  ACP  States and  the United Kingdom  have  agreed 
on  a  price of b  260  per ton for  sugar  shipped in 1975.  For the next  months, 
the quantities agreed total 310  000  tonnes,  white  sugar equivalent,  while 
for  each 12-month period from  1  July to 30  June the total of the  same  quanti-
ties - which in any  case  could not  exceeed 1  400  000  tonnes - will be  around 
1  220  000  tonnes. 
Seen  in the context  of.  a  commodities policy, it can be  acknowledged 
with satisfaction that this agreement  breaks new  ground  and  sets a  remarkable 
precedent  in several  respects: 
i) Institutionally, it creates a  special link between  a  group of various 
developing countries and  the European Economic  Community,  so  much  so 
that the text governing the  common  organization of the market  for the 
product in question will  include  a  Title V  on  the  imports concerned. 
In addition,  the duration .of the commitments is indefinite and not  linked 
to the life of the Convention, although they form  an  integral part of the 
latter. 
ii) As  an  instrument  of price policy,  it introduces what  i a  virtually price 
indexing,  since the guaranteed price is fixed within a  Community  range of 
sugar year prices,  which,  as is known,  is the  subject of annual  proposals 
by the Commission  worked  out  in the light of the  economic  situation at 
the time.  Another point worthy of note is that the  Commission  will con-
sult the exporting ACP  States before  submitting its community  price pro-
posals to the Council. - 21-
iii)  As  an  instrument  of trade policy,  it ensures guaranteed purchase, 
which is of particular importance for the  steady development  of the 
exporting ACP  States,  and  guaranteed supply for the  Community  with-
out  adversely affecting free marketing on its own  markets. 
iv)  Lastly,  as  an  instrument of international relations policy,  the 
reciprocal,  balanced commitments it comprises are  a  token of the 
aspirations of partners who  are  aware  of the  importance of what  is 
at  stake  and  who  see in this agreement  the fulfiment,  in a  specific 
sector,  of their hope  of securing a  fairer and  less unstable economic 
order. - 22- APPENDIX 
Data on  the principal  exports which m;y  be  covered by  STABEX 
1.  STABEX  products as percentage of total  exports 
Botswana 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central  African 
Republic 
Chad 
. Congo,  People's 
Republic of 
Dahomey 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Ivory Coast 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tonga 
Uganda 
Upper  Volta 
Western  Samoa 
raw  hides,  skins and  leather (9 %) 
coffee  (86  %),  cotton  (3 %),  raw hides,  skins and  leather  (6%) 
cocoa  (23  %),  coffee  (26  %),  wood  (12  %) 
coffee  (23  %),  wood  (21  %),  cotton  (18  %) 
cotton  (69 %) 
wood  (42  %) 
palm  products  (34  %) 
coffee  (38  %),  raw hides,  skins and  leather  (13  %) 
coconut  oil  (5  %) 
wood  (32  %) 
groundnuts,  groundnut  oil and  oilcake  (94  %) 
cocoa  (61  %),  wood  (19  %) 
cocoa (15  %),  coffee  (23 %),  wood  (29 %) 
bananas  (4 %) 
coffee  (22  %),  tea (11  %) 
iron ore  (71  %) 
coffee  (30 %),  sisal  (3  %) 
tea (17  %),  groundnuts  (7  %) 
cotton  (39  %),  groundnuts  (7  %) 
iron ore  (73  %) 
groundnuts  (15  %),  groundnut  oil  (9 %) 
coffee  (61  %),  raw hides and  skins  (4 %) 
groundnut s  and  groundnut  oil  ( 35  %) 
iron ore  (10  %),  palm nuts and  kernels  (5  %) 
bananas  (26  %) 
cotton  (56%),  groundnuts  (9 %) 
cotton  (3  %) 
coffee  (19  %),  cotton  (13  %),  sisal  (9 %) 
cocoa beans  (26  %),  coffee  (13  %) 
copra  (50  %) 
coffee  {66  %),  cotton  (15  %),  tea (5  %) 
·groundnuts  and groundnut  oil  (8 %) ,  cotton  (22  %) 
copra (45  %),  cocoa (28  %) 
Sources  International Financial Statistics,  November  1974,  and National 
Statistics - 23-
2.  Imports into the  EEC  (9)  from  the  ACP  (1973) 
Groundnuts  (shelled) 
Groundnut  oil 
Cocoa beans 
Cocoa butter 
Cocoa paste 
Raw  coffee 
Cotton,  not  carded or  combed 
Copra 
Coconut  oil 
Palm  oil 
Palm  kernel oil 
Palm  nuts and  kernels 
Bovine  cattle leather 
T~opical wood  (in the rough) 
Tropical  wood  (sawn) 
Fresh bananas 
Sisal 
Iron ores 
TOTAL  ====== 
1,000 u. a. 
102,169 
83,085 
288,418 
39,189 
12,391 
350,271 
126,855 
763 
6,716 
27,027 
20,685 
32,029 
20,512 
440,111 
73,920 
56,721 
27,926 
275,890 
1.284.678  ==-====== 